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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RENNOLD PENDER, \ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, I 
— vs.—: f 
S. W. DOWSE and PEARL DOWSE, > C a s e N o- 7 9 4 9 
his wife, JAY E. TREADWAY, and 1 
MARION MAVE TREADWAY, his 1 
wife, and A. C. WHITAKER, J 
Defendants and Appellants. J 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS TREADWAY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All of the defendants have appealed from a decree 
of the Third District Court setting aside a sheriff's sale 
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and deed issued upon an execution to S. W. Dowse and 
mortgage and deed executed by him to defendants Tread-
way and Whitaker (E. 249-251). 
The action arose indirectly out of a suit to quiet title 
and for slander of title entitled 8. W. Dowse v. Rennold 
Pender, Defendant, Case No. 86895 in the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County (Findings of Fact, 4, E. 240). 
The respondent S. W. Dowse obtained a small judgment 
for costs in that case, had writ of execution issue, pub-
lished notice of execution sale, and held an execution sale 
on March 14, 1950 (Findings 8, E. 241). The respondent 
Dowse, who was the plaintiff, and the judgment creditor 
in that case, bid in all of the property at that sale for the 
sum of $47.46 (Finding 8, E. 241). The regularity of that 
sale, and the question of its voidability are two of the 
points raised by the appellants Dowse in this case, have 
been adequately covered in their brief, and will not be 
argued herein. 
The property sold in the execution sale was in three 
tracts, all in the North Columbia Subdivision in Salt 
Lake County. In Block 8 the tract covered lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 13 to 21. The Block 6 tract comprised Lots 1,19 and 
20, and the Block 4 tract comprised Lots 2 and 3, 6 and 7 
(Complaint E. 1, Finding 2, E. 239). The Sheriff's Deed 
issued six months and a day after the sheriff's sale, and 
was dated September 16,1950 (Ex. 4, p. 42). Thereafter, 
and on October 19, 1950, the respondents Dows« executed 
a special warranty deed to respondents Treadway cover-
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ing all of Lots 2 and 3, Block 4 of North Columbia Sub-
division, for which the respondents paid $1,000 cash 
(Finding 21, E. 244; Ex. 6). 
Findings 22, 23 and 24 (R, 245) recite that the Tread-
ways had an agreement for warranty deed with Dowse, 
that they had notice from their abstract (Ex. 4) of the 
amount of property sold at the execution sale for $47.46, 
that the sale was accompanied by irregularities in that 
the levy was excessive, the sum paid was grossly inade-
quate, that the sheriff's return failed to cite an attempt 
to sell personal property, and that the property was sold 
en masse, and not in separate parcels, also that the 
Treadways were apprehensive about the regularity of 
the sale and made some inquiries of Mr. Dowse's attor-
ney and that defendants Treadway did not go to the 
source of plaintiff's title by contacting the plaintiff or 
his attorney, further, that defendants J. E. Treadway 
and Marion Mave Treadway, his wife, were not bona fide 
purchasers without notice. 
By amendment to the pretrial order it was provided 
that if the Court should find that defendants Treadway 
are innocent purchasers for value, there would be the 
question whether the respondent is entitled to judgment 
against appellant Dowse for the sum of $1,000 paid by the 
appellants Treadway for the two lots they purchased, or 
to the fair market value of those lots (R. 47 and 54). 
Milton V. Backman was attorney for Pender in case 
No. 86895 (R. 58) and that case was settled without a 
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trial (E. 60). Mr. Backman testified that he recieved the 
findings and decree in that case providing for costs (Ex-
hibit A, B. 62), and subsequent to the entry of the decree 
he and Mr. Duncan arranged for a quit claim deed cover-
ing property in dispute (E. 63). Mr. Backman had free 
and open dealings with Mr. Duncan in that matter and 
had known him over a long period of years; he relied on 
Mr. Duncan in settling that case and relied on Mr. Dun-
can, without anything in writing, to satisfy the judgment 
for costs (B. 63, 65 and 66). Mr. Backman understood 
that the cost judgment was to be satisfied and was sur-
prised when he learned of the execution sale and told 
Mr. Duncan he had assumed that if they were going to 
press the judgment for costs it would have been men-
tioned (E. 68), and told Mr. Duncan it was a violation of 
their agreement for him to proceed with execution sale 
(E. 69). 
Mr. LeCheminant, a qualified appraiser, testified 
that the two lots purchased by the appellants Treadway 
were worth $1080.00 (E. 81). 
Mr. Backman testified on cross examination that he 
personally received the findings and decree in case No. 
86895 on November 4, 1949 (E. 90) and that he received 
the Salt Lake Times (E. 89). Mr. Bleak, deputy sheriff, 
testified that the notice of execution sale was published 
in this paper on February 17th and for four weeks (E. 
142). Mr. Backman further testified that he had relied 
on Mr. Duncan in that case and that it is his practice to 
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rely on attorneys "and I assumed by the same token I 
was dealing with a brother attorney who would treat me 
fairly in this matter" (E. 97 to 98), and for that reason 
paid no attention to the mention of costs in the judgment 
nor to whether a cost bill was served on his office (E. 98). 
Mr. Pender testified that he had known Mr. Dowse 
for many years and had had many business transactions 
with him and that Mr. Dowse had represented him (E. 
103 to 104). He considered Mr. Dowse a close friend (E. 
106, 134). 
Mr. Bleak, Deputy Sheriff, testified that he held the 
sheriff's sale on February 14, 1950 and that only Mr. 
Duncan and Mr. Dowse were present to bid on the prop-
erty and that he offered it for sale in bulk and not in 
separate parcels and that there was no request for sepa-
rate sales (E. 139, 140). He made no effort to locate per-
sonal property belonging to Mr. Pender prior to the sale 
of real property (E. 141). 
Mr. Duncan testified that the property was sold in 
three parcels, the lots in each block being a parcel (E. 
184 to 185) and that he bid separately on each parcel 
(E. 185). He further testified that in his opinion there 
was a judgment for $3,086.44 against Pender, which 
would be a lien against all of Pender's property (E. 191). 
And on cross examination again testified that the prop-
erty was offered in three separate parcels (E. 195, 196). 
He also testified that he did not feel kindly toward Mr. 
Backman because of the settlement in Case No. 86895, 
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which Mr. Backman forced, and that he had no trouble 
with Mr. Backman until that (R. 199, 200). 
Mr. Pender was recalled and testified that most of 
the deals he had been in with Mr. Dowse were quite ques-
tionable and that he would check the titles before deals 
were consummated (E. 224). 
The evidence which specifically concerned the appel-
lants Treadway was stipulated including Exhibit 3 (an 
earnest money receipt), Exhibit 4 (Abstract of Title), 
Exhibit 5 (Title Opinion, written by Richard L. Bird, 
Jr.) , and Exhibit 6, (a special warranty deed, dated Oc-
tober 20, 1950) (R. 158). It was stipulated that the price 
paid was $1,000 for lots 2 and 3, Block 4 (R. 154). It was 
stipulated that Mr. Rich, real estate broker, handled this 
purchase for the appellants Treadway and sent Mrs. 
Nagle to the office of Mr. Dowse for the deed which was 
recorded by her and did not know until after the com-
mencement of this action that the deed given was a spe-
cial warranty deed and not a general warranty deed, (R. 
154-155) and that Mr. Treadway would testify that he 
did not know that fact until after the action was com-
menced, and both of them understood that the deed called 
for by the earnest money receipt was a general warranty 
deed (R, 154-155). 
It was agreed in the pretrial order that the appellants 
Treadway had no notice of defects in the execution sale 
procedure except such as were revealed by the abstract 
to the property (R. 34, paragraph 11). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT ONE 
THE EXECUTION SALE WAS NOT WHOLLY VOID. 
POINT TWO 
THE BOND FIDE PURCHASE OF LOTS 2 AND 3, 
BLOCK 4, BY THE TREADWAYS CUT OFF RESPONDENT'S 
RIGHT TO DEFEAT TITLE OF S. W. DOWSE. 
AKGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE EXECUTION SALE WAS NOT WHOLLY VOID. 
It is our position that after the time for redemption 
had passed, the respondent could no longer attack the 
deed of the purchaser at execution sale. And if the sale 
were voidable only, facts do not exist in this case to per-
mit the respondent to avoid the sale. These appellants 
rely on the brief and the position of the appellants Dowse 
as to this matter. 
POINT TWO . 
THE BOND FIDE PURCHASE OF LOTS 2 AND 3, 
BLOCK 4, BY THE TREADWAYS CUT OFF RESPONDENT'S 
RIGHT TO DEFEAT TITLE OF S. W. DOWSE. 
The statement of Point 2 assumes that the sale on 
execution was voidable at the instance of Pender on di-
rect attack. This question is argued by appellants Dowse 
and these appellants rely on said brief and said position. 
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See also: 33 C. J. S. 589; 1 A. L. R. 1442; 31 Am. Jur. 
Title, Judicial Sales, Sections 83,235,238,241. 
We assume further that the right to avoid the sale 
survived after the lapse of the six months period for 
redemption. Generally speaking, expiration of the period 
of redemption cuts off the right to avoidance and the 
right would survive only by reason of special facts which 
respondent has not here shown, or by reason of the fact 
that the sale was entirely void. This sale was not void, 
but voidable, only. 1 A. L. R. 1442-1443. 
We, therefore, take the position that the appellant 
Dowse conveyed to the Treadways a better title and a 
stronger position than he himself enjoyed by reason of 
the purchase at execution sale. This is the usual rule 
where the doctrine of bona fide purchaser is applicable. 
The bona fide purchase generally cuts off rights of can-
cellation or to set aside sale. 24 AmJur. 272-274; 55 Am. 
Jur. 1119-1120. 
The Treadways, in this case, were bona fide pur-
chasers for full value. The price they paid for Lots 2 
and 3 of Block 4 North Columbia Subdivision was $1,000.-
00 (E. 244). Mr. LeCheminant testified that in his opin-
ion the fair value of these lots, assuming marketable title 
could be given, was $1080.00 (E. 81), which is a slight 
differential. This was no bargain and both the price and 
the agreement for warranty deed indicate that a good 
title was bargained for (Ex. 3). 
The record of the sale, as shown in Exhibit 4, pages 
40, 41, 42 and 43 discloses no irregularity and only that 
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the amount of the judgment was small as compared with 
the value of the property sold. 
In the argument before the District Court the re-
spondent contended that the sheriff's certificate of sale 
and the sheriff's return of sale reflect no effort to find 
personal property belonging to the respondent and con-
tain no proof that the amount of the judgment was not 
bid for a single parcel of land. 
The same abstract discloses the sheriff's sale on 
execution by which the respondent initially acquired his 
title to this property. The original execution is at page 
29 of Exhibit 4 and is in exactly the same form as page 
40. The difference is that the amount of the judgment in 
that case was larger. The certificate of sale at page 31 
is the same as the certificate at page 41 except that less 
property was sold, and the Sheriff's Deed at page 38 was 
issued shortly after six months from the date of sale had 
expired in the same manner that the deed on page 42 was. 
The sheriff's certificate at page 41 does not disclose 
whether the property was sold in separate parcels or 
whether there was no bid for separate parcels and the 
sheriff was compelled to sell all of the land to obtain a 
bid, or whether the sheriff offered all of the land for 
sale initially, in an improper manner. 
The record shows that the attorney for the Tread-
ways examined Exhibit 4 and wrote an opinion thereon 
which was Exhibit 5, which refers to inquiry made of Mr. 
Duncan, the attorney for the judgment creditor who was 
present at the sale, to determine whether the sale was 
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lawfully conducted. Exhibit 5 discloses that Mr. Duncan 
answered that the property was sold in separate parcels 
and that the total of the separate pieces was the amount 
recited in the certificate. The record further shows that 
Mr. Treadway and his agent, Mr. Rich, relied on this 
opinion and this information and had no knowledge of 
any irregularity in the sale (R. 155,156). 
Such inquiry was reasonable and the making of the 
inquiry, as well as the answer received, establish the good 
faith of the Treadways. The only reasonable assump-
tion is that Mr. Duncan who brought this sale about 
would have a better recollection of its conduct than the 
Sheriff's Office which conducts many sales. This was a 
proper and sufficient inquiry within the rules noted at 
55 Am. Jur. 1080-1081. 
Respondent argued in the District Court, and will 
probably argue here, that we shouldn't have made inquiry 
of, or relied on Mr. Duncan. The information needed 
was how the sale was conducted. Neither Mr. Backman 
nor Mr. Pender was present at the sale and neither 
could give any help. 
We relied on an attorney in good standing — an 
officer of the Courts. 
Mr. Backman relied on Mr. Duncan in much the same 
manner that we did. Respondent takes this position: 
His attorney got him in this mess by relying on a fellow 
attorney in the settlement of the earlier case (Dowse v. 
Pender, No. 86895). He did this despite the fact that 
he had actual, personal notice of judgment for costs (R. 
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62, 90, Ex. A) and his office received the memorandum 
of costs (E. 98). He received the Salt Lake Times (E. 89) 
wherein the notice of sale was published (E. 142), and yet 
did nothing by way of inquiry to protect his client and 
confirm his understanding of the settlement. 
Despite all this reliance on Mr. Duncan, despite the 
warnings that the two attorneys had different under-
standings of the settlement, the respondent and Mr. 
Backman asked the equity court for relief from their own 
carelessness and got it! 
These appellants, who had no notice that anything 
was wrong, ask only that their reliance on the same per-
son (Mr. Duncan) be protected in like manner as an act 
of good faith. 
Mr. Backman set the stage by relying on Mr. Duncan 
and should not be heard to say to us that Mr. Duncan 
was unreliable. 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis of the authorities supports the execu-
tion sale against this belated attack. And regardless of 
the holding on the main issue of the case the court should 
protect appellants Treadway as bona fide purchasers 
for full value without notice of irregularities in the sale. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
EICHAEDS AND BIED and 
KEITH JAY HOLDSWOETH 
Attorneys for Appellants 
TREADWAY 
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